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Abstract In large-scale distributed information sys-
tems, where participants are autonomous and have spe-
cial interests for some queries, query allocation is a chal-
lenge. Much work in this context has focused on dis-
tributing queries among providers in a way that max-
imizes overall performance (typically throughput and
response time). However, preserving the participants’
interests is also important. In this paper, we make the
following contributions. First, we provide a model to de-
fine the participants’ perception of the system regard-
ing their interests and propose measures to evaluate the
quality of query allocation methods. Then, we propose
a framework for query allocation called Satisfaction-
based Query Load Balancing (SQLB, for short), which
dynamically trades consumers’ interests for providers’
interests based on their satisfaction. Finally, we com-
pare SQLB, through experimentation, with two impor-
tant baseline query allocation methods, namely Capa-
city based and Mariposa-like . The results demonstrate
that SQLB yields high efficiency while satisfying the
participants’ interests and significantly outperforms the
baseline methods.
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1 Introduction
We consider distributed information systems with a
mediator that allows consumers to access informa-
tion providers through queries [23,36]. Consumers and
providers (which we refer to participants) are au-
tonomous in the sense that they are free to leave the
mediator at any time and do not depend on anyone to
do so. In the context of a single mediator, leaving the
mediator is equivalent to depart from the system, but it
could be that, in a multi-mediator system, a participant
registers to another competing mediator.
Providers can be heterogeneous in terms of capac-
ity and data. Heterogeneous capacity means that some
providers are more powerful than others and can treat
more queries per time unit. Data heterogeneity means
that providers provide different data and thus produce
different results for the same query. Providers declare
their capabilities for performing queries to the mediator.
Then, the main function of the mediator is to allocate
each incoming query to the providers that can satisfy it.
Much work in this context has focused on distributing
the query load among the providers in a way that max-
imizes overall performance (typically throughput and
response time), i.e. query load balancing (qlb) [6,12,24,
35,40]. Nevertheless, participants usually have certain
expectations with respect to the mediator, which are
not only performance-related (see Example 1). Such ex-
pectations mainly reflect their preferences to allocate
and perform queries. Consumers’ preferences may rep-
resent e.g. their interests towards providers (based on
reputation for example), preferred providers, or quality
of service. Providers’ preferences may represent, for ex-
ample, their topics of interests, relationships with other
participants, or strategies.
2Fig. 1 Overview of Query Allocation.
Example 1 Consider a provider that represents a
courier company. During the promotion of its new in-
ternational shipping service, the provider is more inter-
ested in treating queries related to international ship-
ments rather than national ones. Once the advertising
campaign is over, its preferences may change. Similarly,
consumers expect the system to provide them with in-
formation that best fits their preferences.
In this context, because of participants’ autonomy,
dissatisfaction is a problem since it may lead partici-
pants to leave the mediator. Thus, it is important to
have a query allocation strategy that balances queries
such that participants are satisfied. Participant’s satis-
faction means that the query allocation method meets
its expectations. To make this possible, the partici-
pants’ preferences must be taken into consideration
when balancing queries. However, preferences are usu-
ally considered as private data by participants (e.g. in
an e-commerce scenario, enterprises do not reveal their
business strategies). In addition, preferences are static
data, i.e. long-run, while the desire of a participant to
allocate and perform queries may depend on its con-
text and thus is more dynamic, i.e. short-run. For in-
stance, in Example 1, even if the provider (the courier
company) prefers to perform queries related to interna-
tional shipments during its advertising campaign, it is
possible that, at some time, it may not desire to per-
form such queries because of other local reasons, e.g.
by overload. Thus, participants are required to express
their desire to allocate and perform queries via their
intention, which may stem e.g. from combining their
preferences and other local consideration such as load
and reputation (see Figure 1).
In such distributed information systems, query allo-
cation is a challenge for several reasons.
– There is no definition of satisfaction to reflect how
well the system meets the participants’ expectations
in the long-run. Economic approaches consider util-
ity and individual rationality, but utility is not nor-
malized and is commonly related to economic no-
tions (e.g. money), and individual rationality does
not capture long-run aspects.
– Participants’ expectations may be contradictory
among them as well as with respect to the system
performance.
– The query allocation process should be adaptable
to applications and self-adaptable to changes in
the participants’ expectations because such expec-
tations usually change in the course of time.
– Unlike several economic models [9,10,42], queries
must be always treated whenever possible (if there
exits at least one provider to perform it) even if
providers do not desire to deal with them. This is
because consumers that do not get results may be-
come dissatisfied and thus simply leave the system,
which may hurt providers as well.
– Participants’ departures may have consequences on
the functionalities provided by the system. The
providers’ departure may mean the loss of impor-
tant system capabilities and the consumers’ depar-
ture is a loss of queries for providers.
To our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed
completely before. Thus, our first objective is to pro-
pose a model that provides a satisfaction notion to re-
flect how well the mediator meets the participants’ ex-
pectations in the long-run. Then, our second objective
is to propose a query allocation framework that consid-
ers both satisfaction and intentions of participants.
1.1 Motivating Example
Consider a public e-marketplace where thousands of
companies can share information and do business (such
as ebay-business [1] and freightquote [3]). Here, busi-
ness is understood in a very general sense, not neces-
sarily involving money. Each site, which represents a
company, preserves its preferences to allocate and per-
form queries. To scale up and be attractive over time, an
e-marketplace should (i) protect, in the long-run, the
participants’ intentions for doing business, (ii) allow
consumers to quickly obtain results, and (iii) allocate
queries so that providers should have the same possi-
bilities for doing business, i.e. to avoid starvation [11].
Consider a simple scenario where a company
(eWine), which desires to ship wine from France to
USA, requests the mediator for companies providing in-
ternational shipping services, such as freightquote [3].
Here, a query is a call for proposals that providers have
to answer in order to provide their services. Suppose
that eWine, to make its final choice, desires to receive
proposals from the two best providers that meet its in-
tentions. Similarly, providers desire to participate only
3Table 1 Providers for eWine’s query.
Providers Prov.’s Int. Cons.’s Int. Avail. Cap.
p1 Yes No 0.85
p2 No Yes 0.57
p3 Yes No 0.22
p4 No Yes 0.15
p5 Yes Yes 0
in those negotiations that involve queries meeting their
intentions. In this scenario, the mediator must perform
several tasks.
First, it needs to identify the sites that are able
to deal with eWine’s query, i.e. to find the relevant
providers. There is a large body of work on matchmak-
ing, see e.g. [17,20], so we do not focus on this problem
in this paper.
Second, the mediator should obtain eWine’s inten-
tions to deal with such providers and the providers’
intention to deal with eWine’s query1. This can be
done following the architecture proposed in [18]. As-
sume that the resulting list contains, for simplicity, only
5 providers: p1, . . . , p5. Table 1 shows these providers
with their intention to perform the query and eWine’s
intention to deal with each of them. To better illustrate
the query allocation problem in these environments, we
also show in Table 1 the providers’ available capacity.
However, it is not always possible to know this infor-
mation since providers may consider it as private.
Suppose, then, that p5 is overloaded, i.e. has no more
resources for doing business, and that p2 and p4 do not
intend to deal with eWine’s query (notice that this does
not means they can refuse it) because e.g. p2 is more
interested in its new shipping service to the Asian conti-
nent (such as in Example 1) and p3 has bad experience
with eWine. Also, assume that eWine does not intend
to deal with p1 nor p3 since it does not trust them e.g.
because of their reputation.
Finally, the mediator needs to select the two most
available providers, such that eWine’s and providers’
intentions be respected. To the best of our knowledge,
no existing e-marketplace is able to do so. In fact, cur-
rent qlb methods, whose aim is to select the most avail-
able providers, also fail in such scenarios since neither p2
intends to deal with the query nor p1 is of eWine’s in-
terest. Thus, allocating the query to these providers dis-
satisfies p2 and eWine in such a query allocation. And,
whether this occurs several times may cause their de-
parture from the system. The only satisfactory option,
regarding the participants’ intention, is p5. But, allo-
cating the query to it may considerably hurt response
1 For simplicity, we assume in this example that the intentions
values are binary.
time, which dissatisfies eWine with a poor response
time and p5 by overloading it. Again, whether this oc-
curs several times may cause their departure from the
system. Furthermore, eWine desires to receive two dif-
ferent proposals.
So, what should the mediator do in the above sce-
nario? Should it consider the consumer’s intention? the
providers’ intention? or the providers’ available capac-
ity? In this paper, we address this question so that a
query allocation method can decide on the fly what to
do according to the participants’ status.
1.2 Contributions and Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After
defining the problem in Section 2, we present the main
contributions of this paper:
– We propose a new model to characterize the par-
ticipants’ expectations in the long-run, which al-
lows evaluating a system from a satisfaction point of
view. This model facilitates the design and evalua-
tion of qlb methods when confronted to autonomous
participants (Section 3).
– We define the properties that allow evaluating the
quality of qlb methods and propose measures to do
so (Section 4).
– We propose Satisfaction-based Query Load Balanc-
ing (SQLB, in short), a flexible framework with
self-adapting algorithms to allocate queries while
considering both qlb and participants’ intentions.
SQLB affords consumers the flexibility to trade
their preferences for the providers’ reputation and
providers the flexibility to trade their preferences for
their utilization. It also allows the mediator to trade
consumers’ intentions for providers’ intentions. Fur-
thermore, SQLB affords the mediator the flexibility
to adapt the query allocation process to the appli-
cation by varying several parameters (Section 5).
– We demonstrate, through experimental valida-
tion, that SQLB significantly outperforms base-
line methods, the Capacity based andMariposa-like
methods, and yields significant performance bene-
fits. We demonstrate the self-adaptability of SQLB
to participants’ expectations and its adaptability to
different kinds of application. We also show that
applying the proposed measures over the provided
model allows the prediction of possible departures
of participants (Section 6).
Then, we survey related work in Section 7 and conclude
the paper in Section 8.
This paper is an extended version of [32] with the
following added value. We present new global character-
4istics that allow evaluating the query allocation method
in a more objective way (Section 3.3) and discuss in
Section 3.4 the two possible levels of satisfaction that
a participant can have. We also define in Section 5.3.2
a strategy that allows the mediator to adapt the query
allocation process to applications independently of the
way in which participants compute their intentions.
Furthermore, we analyze the SQLB communication
cost in Section 5.3.4. Finally, we run new experimen-
tations to demonstrate the adaptability of SQLB to
the participants’ expectations (Section 6.3.3) as well as
to validate the proposed strategy (Section 6.3.4).
2 Problem Definition
We consider a system consisting of a mediator m, of a
set of consumers C, and of a set of providers P . These
sets are not necessary disjoint, an entity may play more
than one role. Queries are formulated in a format ab-
stracted as a triple q = < c, d, n > such that q.c ∈ C
is the identifier of the consumer that has issued the
query, q.d is the description of the task to be done,
and q.n ∈ N∗ is the number of providers to which the
consumer wishes to allocate its query. Parameter q.d is
intended to be used within a matchmaking procedure
to find the set of providers that are able to treat q, de-
noted by set Pq. As noted earlier, such techniques are
out of the scope of this paper and thus we assume there
exists one in the system, e.g. [17,20], that is sound and
complete: it does not return false positive nor false neg-
atives. We use Nq for denoting ||Pq ||, or simply N when
there is no ambiguity on q.
Consumers send their queries to mediator m that
allocates each incoming query q to q.n providers in Pq.
We only consider the arrival of feasible queries, that is
those queries in which there exists at least one provider,
which is able to perform them, in the system. For the
sake of simplicity we only use, throughout this paper,
the term “query” to denote a feasible query. Query al-
location of some query q among the providers in Pq is
a vector All−→oc of length N , or All−→ocq and Nq if there
is an ambiguity on q, such that,
∀p ∈ Pq, All
−→oc [p] =
1 if p gets q
0 otherwise
As we assume that queries should be treated if possi-
ble, this leads to
∑
p∈Pq
All−→oc [p] = min(q.n, N). In the
following, the set of providers such that All−→oc [p] = 1 is
noted P̂q. Notice that, without any loss of generality, in
some cases, e.g. when consumers pay services with real
money, query allocation just means that providers are
selected for participating in a negotiation process with
consumers. Providers have a finite capacity to perform
queries, denoted by function cap > 0. The capacity of
a provider denotes the number of computational units
that it can have. Thus, the utilization of a provider p
at time t, denoted by function Ut(p), is defined as p’s
load with regards to its capacity.
A consumer c ∈ C is free to express its inten-
tion cic(q, p) for allocating its query q to each provider
p ∈ Pq, which are stored in vector
−→
CIq. Similarly, a
provider p ∈ Pq is free to express its intention pip(q)
for performing a query q. Values of participants’ inten-
tion are in the interval [−1..1]. A positive value means
that a provider (resp. a consumer) intends to perform
(allocate) a query, while a negative value means that a
provider (a consumer) does not intend to perform (al-
locate) a query2. A null value, i.e. a 0 value, denotes
a participant’s indifference. It is up to a participant to
compute its own intentions by combining different lo-
cal and external criteria (e.g. utilization, preferences,
response time, reputation, past experience, etc.). The
way in which a participant computes its intentions is
considered as private information and is not revealed
to other participants.
In these environments, where participants are au-
tonomous, it is crucial that a query allocation method
considers participants’ intentions in order to preserve
the total system capacity, i.e. the aggregate capacity of
all providers (e.g. in terms of computational or phys-
ical resources). To summarize, we can state the query
allocation problem as follows.
Problem Statement. Given a mediator dealing
with autonomous participants, the problem we address
is computing and using participants’ intentions to per-
form query allocation at the mediator such that re-
sponse time, system capacity, and participants’ satis-
faction are ensured.
3 Pariticpants’ Characterization
We define, in this section, a model that allows com-
paring query allocation methods having different ap-
proaches to regulate the system, such as economic and
qlb methods. We are interested in two characteristics of
participants that show how they perceive the system in
which they interact.
The first one is adequation. From a general point of
view, two kinds of adequation could be considered:
– the system adequation to a participant, e.g. a sys-
tem where a provider (respectively consumer) can-
2 It is worth remembering that this does not means it can refuse
to perform (resp. allocate) the query.
5not find any query (resp. provider) it desires is con-
sidered inadequate to such a participant, and
– the participant’s adequation to the system, e.g. a
provider (respectively consumer) that no consumer
wants to deal with (resp. issuing queries that no
provider intends to treat) is considered inadequate
to the system.
Let us illustrate both adequation notions via an exam-
ple. Consider the case of the courier company of the
Example 1, which is interested in its new international
shipping service. A market place may be adequate to
such a courier company because many consumers are
interested in sending products abroad. But the courier
company may be not adequate to the market place be-
cause many consumers do not want to deal with it.
Both adequation notions are needed to evaluate
whether it is possible for a participant to reach its
goals in the system. A participant cannot know what
the other participants think about it, except if it has a
global knowledge of the system. Therefore, we consider
the participant’s adequation to the system as a global
characteristic.
The second characteristic is satisfaction. As for ad-
equation, two kinds of satisfaction could be considered:
– the satisfaction of a participant with what it gets
from the system, e.g. a provider (respectively con-
sumer) that receives queries (resp. results from the
providers) it does not want is not satisfied, and
– the participant’s satisfaction with the job that the
query allocation method does, e.g. a provider (re-
spectively consumer) that performs queries (resp.
results from the providers) it does not want is not
satisfied with the query allocation method whether
there exist queries (resp. providers) of its interests
that it does not get.
To illustrate both satisfactions, consider again the
case of the courier company of the Example 1. This
courier company may be dissatisfied, in a market place,
because consumers are rarely interested in doing their
shipments abroad and thus almost all queries it per-
forms are requests for national shipments. Nevertheless,
it is possible that this courier company is satisfied with
the query allocation method because the only incom-
ing queries requesting for international shipments are
allocated to it.
Both satisfaction notions may have a deep impact on
the system, because participants may decide whether to
stay or to leave the system based on them. In addition
to the two kinds of adequation and satisfaction, we are
interested in two other global characteristics: Allocation
Efficiency w.r.t. a Consumer and Allocation Efficiency
w.r.t. a Provider. In the following, we define all previous
notions with regards to what a participant can observe
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We then define the previous
global notions in Section 3.3, which are only observable
by the mediator.
It is worth noting that, because of autonomy, pre-
serving the participants’ intentions is quite important
so that they have some interest in staying in the system.
At first glance, the system should satisfy participants in
each interaction with them. However, this is simply not
possible in reality, considering that a query is generally
not allocated to all relevant providers. Furthermore, it
is not because a single query allocation penalizes a par-
ticipant’s intention that it decides to leave the system.
A participant generally considers some past queries to
measure its happiness in the system and to evaluate if
it should leave the system. A way to achieve this is to
make a regular assessment over all their past interac-
tions with the system, but participants have a limited
memory capacity. Thus, they regularly assess only their
k last interactions with the system. This is why we de-
fine the characteristics of participants over the k last
interactions. Clearly, the k value may be different on
each participant depending on its memory capacity. For
simplicity, we assume they all use the same value of k.
Let us make two other general remarks. First, the
participant’s characteristics may evolve with time, but
for the sake of simplicity we do not introduce time in
our notations. Second, the following presentation can
be expressed with respect to participants’ intentions
(dynamic data) or with respect to their preferences
(static data). However, applying the following charac-
terization to intentions and preferences yields to differ-
ent results, because the intentions of participants con-
sider their context (such as their strategy and utiliza-
tion) and their preferences do not. While in almost all
information systems preferences tend to be private in-
formation, intentions tend to be public. Since we only
intend to observe the system behavior, we develop the
following definitions for intentions.
3.1 Local Consumer Characterization
Our characterization considers only the information
that a consumer can obtain from the system. This char-
acterization needs to use the memory of each consumer
c ∈ C, which is denoted by set IQkc . Intuitively, the
characteristics we present in this section are useful to
answer the following questions:
– “How well do the expectations of a consumer corre-
spond to the providers that were able to deal with
its last queries?” – System-Consumer Adequation – ,
6– “How far do the providers that have dealt with the
last queries of a consumer meet its expectations?”
– Consumer Satisfaction – , and
– “Does the query allocation method do a good job for
a consumer?” – Consumer Allocation Satisfaction –.
3.1.1 Adequation
The system adequation to a consumer characterizes
the perception that the consumer has from the system.
For example, in our motivating example of Section 1.1,
eWine considers the mediator as interesting (i.e. ade-
quate), in such a query allocation, because it advertises
providers that eWine considers interesting: p2, p4, and
p5. Formally, the system adequation w.r.t. a consumer
c ∈ C and concerning a query q, denoted by δsca(c, q),
is defined as the average of c’s intentions towards set
Pq (Equation 1). Its values are in the interval [0..1].
δsca(c, q) =
1
Nq
·
∑
p∈Pq
((−→
CIq[p] + 1
)/
2
)
(1)
We thus define the system adequation to a consumer
as the average over the adequation values concerning its
k last queries.
Definition 1 System-Consumer Adequation
δsca(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
·
∑
q∈IQkc
δsca(c, q)
Its values are between 0 and 1. The closer the value to 1,
the more a consumer considers the system as adequate.
3.1.2 Satisfaction
This notion evaluates whether a mediator is allocating
the queries of a consumer to the providers from which
it wants to get results. To define the consumer’s satis-
faction over its k last issued queries, we first define the
satisfaction of a consumer concerning the allocation of
a given query. The average of intentions expressed by a
consumer to the providers that performed its query is
an intuitive technique to define such a notion. Never-
theless, a simple average does not take into account the
fact that a consumer may desire different results. Let
us illustrate this using our motivating example. Assume
that the mediator allocates eWine’s query only to p2,
to which eWine has an intention of 1, but it was re-
quiring two providers. A simple average would not take
this into account. This is why the following equation
takes this point into account using n instead of ||P̂q||.
δs(c, q) =
1
n
·
∑
p∈cPq
((−→
CIq[p] + 1
)/
2
)
(2)
where n stands for q.n. The δs(c, q) values are in the
interval [0..1]. The satisfaction of a consumer is then
defined as the average over its obtained satisfactions
concerning its k last queries. Its values are between 0
and 1. The closer the satisfaction to 1, the more the
consumer is satisfied.
Definition 2 Consumer Satisfaction
δs(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
·
∑
q∈IQkc
δs(c, q)
Since this notion of satisfaction does not consider
the context, it does not allow to evaluate the efforts
made by the query allocation method to satisfy a con-
sumer. Let us illustrate this by means of our motivat-
ing example. Assume that eWine has an intention of 1,
0.9, and 0.7 for allocating its query to p2, p4, and p5,
respectively. Now, suppose that the mediator allocates
the query to p4. Such a query allocation corresponds
to eWine’s high intentions, so eWine is satisfied. How-
ever, there is still a provider to which its intention is
higher (p2). The Consumer Allocation Satisfaction no-
tion, denoted by δas(c), allows to evaluate how well the
query allocation method works for a consumer. Its val-
ues are in the interval [0..∞].
Definition 3 Consumer Allocation Satisfaction
δas(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
·
∑
q∈IQkc
δs(c, q)
δsca(c, q)
If the obtained value is greater than 1, the consumer
can conclude that the query allocation method acts to
its favor. However, if the value is smaller than 1, the
query allocation method dissatisfies the consumer. Fi-
nally, a value equal to 1 means that the query allocation
method is neutral.
3.2 Local Provider Characterization
This section is devoted to the possible characterization
of a provider according to the information that it can
obtain from the system. To this end, a provider p ∈ P
tracks its expressed intentions for performing the k last
proposed queries (allocated to it or not) into vector
−−→
PPIp. We denote the k last proposed queries to p by
set PQkp. Intuitively, this characterization is useful to
answer the following questions:
– “How well do the expectations of a provider cor-
respond to the last queries that the mediator has
proposed to it?” – System-Provider Adequation – ,
– “How well do the last queries that a provider has
treated meet its expectations?” – Provider Satisfac-
tion – , and
7– “Does the query allocation method do a good job for
a provider?” – Provider Allocation Satisfaction –.
3.2.1 Adequation
The system adequation w.r.t. a provider evaluates if the
system corresponds to the expectations of a provider.
Considering our motivating example, one can consider
the mediator as adequate to p1, p3, and p5, because
eWine’s query is of their interest. However, it is difficult
to conclude by considering only one query. An average
over the k last interactions is more informative. Thus,
we define the adequation of the system w.r.t. a provider
p ∈ P , δa(p), as the average of p’s shown intentions
towards set PQkp.
Definition 4 System-Provider Adequation
δspa(p) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
||PQkp||
·
∑
q∈PQkp
((−−→
PPIp[q] + 1
)/
2
)
0 if PQkp = ∅
The values that this adequation can take are in the
interval [0..1]. The closer the value is to 1, the greater
the adequation of the system to a provider is.
3.2.2 Satisfaction
Conversely to the adequation notion, the satisfaction
of a provider only depends on the queries that it per-
forms and is independent of the other queries that have
been proposed to it. To illustrate this notion, suppose
that in our motivating example, the mediator allocates
eWine’ query to p2. In such a query allocation, p2 is not
satisfied since it did not intend to perform the query.
Nonetheless, considering a query allocation alone is not
very meaningful for a provider. What is more impor-
tant for a provider is to be globally satisfied with the
queries it performs. Thus, we formally define the satis-
faction of a provider p ∈ P in Definition 5. Set SQkp
(SQkp ⊆ PQ
k
p) denotes the set of queries that provider
p performed among the set of proposed queries (PQkp).
The δs(p) values are between 0 and 1. The closer the
value to 1, the greater the satisfaction of a provider.
Definition 5 Provider Satisfaction
δs(p) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
||SQkp||
·
∑
q∈SQkp
((−−→
PPIp[q] + 1
)/
2
)
0 if SQkp = ∅
The satisfaction notion evaluates whether the sys-
tem is giving queries to a provider according to its
(those of the provider) expectations so that it fulfills
its objectives. So, as for consumers, a provider is sim-
ply not satisfied when it does not get what it expects.
Here again, there are different reasons for this. First, it
may be because the system does not have interesting re-
sources, i.e. the system has a low adequation w.r.t. the
provider. Second, the query allocation method may go
against the provider’s intention. The latter is measured
by the allocation satisfaction notion. In other words, by
means of this notion a provider can evaluate how well
the query allocation method works for it. Conversely
to a consumer that always receives results at each in-
teraction, a provider is not allocated all the proposed
queries. So the formal definition is a little different. We
formally define the allocation satisfaction notion of a
provider p ∈ P , denoted by δas(p), as the ratio of its
Satisfaction to its system-provider adequation. Its val-
ues are between 0 and ∞.
Definition 6 Provider Allocation Satisfaction
δas(p) =
δs(p)
δspa(p)
If the allocation satisfaction of a provider p is greater
than 1, the query allocation method works well for p
(from the point of view of p). If the value is smaller
than 1, the closer it is to zero, the more p is dissatisfied
with the query allocation method. Finally, a value equal
to 1 means the query allocation method is neutral.
3.3 Global Characterization
Conversely to Sections 3.1 and 3.2 that evaluate the
query allocation method regarding what a participant
perceives from the system, this section allows evaluat-
ing the query allocation method from a general point
of view. For example, it is possible that a consumer (re-
spectively a provider) is not satisfied with the job the
query allocation is doing because providers (resp. con-
sumers) generally do not want to deal with its queries
(resp. do not want to get results from it). This global
characterization considers this point. The goal of these
characteristics is to answer the following questions:
– “How well do the last queries of a consumer cor-
respond to the expectations of the providers that
were able to deal with?” – Consumer-System Ade-
quation – ,
– “How well does a provider correspond to the con-
sumer’s expectations?” – Provider-System Adequa-
tion – , and
– “How well does the query allocation method per-
form w.r.t. a consumer or a provider?” – Allocation
Efficiency w.r.t. a Consumer – and – Allocation Ef-
ficiency w.r.t. a Provider – , respectively.
8The consumer’s adequation to the system evaluates
how much providers are interested in the queries of a
consumer. Going back to our motivating example, we
can say that eWine is adequate to the system since
great part of providers desire to treat its query. Accord-
ing to this intuition, the adequation of a consumer c to
the system concerning its interaction with the system
for allocating its query q, noted δcsa(c, q), is defined as
the average of the intentions shown by set Pq towards
its query q (Equation 3). Its values are between 0 and
1. Vector
−→
PIq denotes the Pq’s intentions to perform q.
δcsa(c, q) =
1
||Pq||
·
∑
p∈Pq
((−→
PIq[p] + 1
)/
2
)
(3)
Thus, we define the consumer’s adequation to the
system as the average over the δcsa values obtained in
its k last queries. Its values are between 0 and 1. The
closer the value to 1, the greater the adequation of a
consumer to the system.
Definition 7 Consumer-System Adequation
δcsa(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
·
∑
q∈IQkc
δcsa(c, q)
Having formally defined the consumer-system ad-
equation global notion, the query allocation efficiency
w.r.t. a consumer c ∈ C, δae(c), is then defined as in
Definition 8. Its values are between 0 and ∞.
Definition 8 Allocation Efficiency w.r.t. a Consumer
δae(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
·
∑
q∈IQkc
δs(c, q)
δsca(c, q) · δcsa(c, q)
On the one hand, as for the allocation satisfaction
notion, the query allocation efficiency w.r.t. a consumer
allows to evaluate the job done by the query alloca-
tion method for a consumer. This evaluation is objec-
tive since it considers the consumer’s adequation to the
system in addition to the system’s adequation to the
consumer. On the other hand, the query allocation ef-
ficiency w.r.t. a provider objectively evaluates (since it
also considers the provider’s adequation to the system)
how much the query allocation method strives to give
interesting queries to providers. To define this latter
global notion, as for a consumer, we need to know how
much a provider is adequate to the system.
The adequation of a provider to the system allows
to evaluate if consumers are interested in interacting
with it. To illustrate the Provider-System Adequation,
we use again our motivating example. One may consider
p1 and p3 as inadequate to the system (with regards to
what they can perceive) since eWine does not want
to deal with. Nevertheless, the most important is to
evaluate that interaction over set PQkp of queries. So,
we formally define the adequation of a provider p ∈
P to the system over the last k proposed queries in
Definition 9. Its values are in the interval [0..1]. The
closer the value to 1, the greater the adequation of a
provider to the system.
Definition 9 Provider-System Adequation
δpsa(p) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
||PQkp||
·
∑
q∈PQkp
((−→
CIq[p] + 1
)/
2
)
0 if PQkp = ∅
We then define the efficiency of the query alloca-
tion w.r.t. a provider p ∈ P , denoted by the function
δae(p), as the ratio of its satisfaction to the product of
its system-provider adequation by its provider-system
adequation. Its values are in [0..∞].
Definition 10 Allocation Efficiency w.r.t. a Provider
δae(p) =
δs(p)
δspa(p) · δpsa(p)
If the efficiency value of the query allocation with re-
gards to a participant (consumer or provider) is greater
than 1, the query allocation method does a good job for
the participant (considering its adequation to the sys-
tem). If the value is smaller than 1, the efficiency of the
query allocation is not good. In the case the value is 1,
the query allocation method is neutral to a participant.
3.4 Discussion
The proposed model can be applied with different pur-
poses. First, to evaluate how well a query allocation
method satisfies the participants’ expectations. Second,
to try to explain the reasons of the participants’ depar-
tures from the system. For example, to know if they are
leaving the system because (i) they are dissatisfied with
the queries they perform, (ii) they are dissatisfied with
the mediator’s job, or (iii) the system is inadequate to
them. To do so, one has to apply measures, which reflect
a global behavior, over all concepts of the model: ade-
quation, satisfaction, and allocation efficiency (see Sec-
tion 4). Third, to design new self-adaptable query al-
location methods that meet the participants’ expecta-
tions in the long-run (see Section 5).
As noted earlier, even if the model can be applied to
the preferences and intentions of participants, the inter-
pretation of results is not the same. Thus, two different
levels of satisfaction exist: at the preferences’ and in-
tentions’ level. On the one hand, the satisfaction at the
preferences’ level reflects the happiness of a participant
9with what it is doing in the system. On the other hand,
it is with the satisfaction at the intentions’ level that a
participant evaluates if the mediator generally gives to
it the queries it asks for. Thus, a participant can know
if it is properly computing its intentions by evaluating
both satisfactions. For instance, a participant can ob-
serve that its expressed intentions do not allow it to
be satisfied at its preferences’ level even if the media-
tor does a good job for it and then it is satisfied at its
intentions’ level.
Moreover, notice that several possibilities to com-
pute participants’ satisfaction may exist. For example,
participants’ satisfaction may decrease with the time
or consider the number of received queries. However, to
explore and explain all the possibilities to compute par-
ticipants’ satisfaction is well beyond the scope of this
paper. In fact, this could be the subject of a full paper.
We thus report this to future work.
As final remark, reputation does not directly ap-
pear, but it is clear that it has a major role to play in
the manner that participants work out their intentions.
Thus, it is taken into account as much as participants
consider it important.
4 System Measures
The measures we use are the same for consumers and
providers, and can be used to evaluate the δsca, δcsa,
δs, δas, δae, and Ut values of a participant. Thus, for
simplicity, the g function denotes one of these functions
and S denotes either a set of consumers or providers,
i.e. S ⊆ C or S ⊆ P . To better evaluate the quality
of a query allocation method for balancing queries, one
should reflect:
– the effort that a query allocation method does for
either maximizing or minimizing a set S of g values
– efficiency – ,
– any change in a set S of g values – sensitivity – ,
and
– the distance from the minimal value to the maximal
one in a set S of g values – balance – .
A well-known measure that reflects the efficiency
of a query allocation method is the mean µ function.
Because participants’ characteristics (see Section 3) are
additive values and may take zero values, we utilize the
arithmetic mean to obtain this representative number
(Equation 4).
µ(g, S) =
1
||S||
·
∑
s∈S
g(s) (4)
However, the mean measure might be severely af-
fected by extreme values. Thus, we must reflect the g
values’ fluctuations in S, i.e. the sensitivity of a query
allocation method. In other words, we evaluate how fair
a query allocation method is w.r.t. a set S of g values.
An appropriate measure to do so is the fairness index
f proposed in [14] (defined in Equation 5). Its values
are between 0 and 1.
f(g, S) =
(∑
s∈S
g(s)
)2
||S||
(∑
s∈S
g(s)2
) (5)
Intuitively, the greater the fairness value of a set
S of g values, the fairer the query allocation process
with respect to such values. To illustrate the sensitivity
property, suppose that there exist two competitive me-
diators m and m′ in our motivating example. Assume,
then, that the set of providers registered to m and m′
are P = {p1, p2, p3} and P ′ = {p′1, p
′
2, p
′
3}, respectively.
Now, consider that the satisfaction of such providers
are δs(p1) = 0.2, δs(p2) = 1, δs(p3) = 0.6, δs(p
′
1) = 1,
δs(p
′
2) = 0.7, and δs(p
′
3) = 0.9. Reflecting the sensitiv-
ity of both mediators w.r.t. satisfaction (0.77 and 0.97
for m and m′ respectively), we can observe that com-
panies have almost the same chances of doing business
in m′, which is not the case in m.
Finally, a traditional measure that reflects the en-
sured balance by a query allocation method is the Min-
Max ratio. The Min-Max ratio σ is defined in Equa-
tion 6 (where c0 > 0 is some fixed constant). Its values
are between 0 and 1. The greater the balance value of a
set S of g values, the better the balance of such values.
The Min-Max ratio is useful to know whether there ex-
ists a great different between the most satisfied entity
s ∈ S and the less satisfied entity s′ ∈ S (with s 6= s′),
and then, one can evaluate if this is because of the query
allocation method or the entity’s adequation.
σ(g, S) =
min
s∈S
g(s) + c0
max
s′∈S
g(s′) + c0
(6)
The above three measures are complementary to
evaluate the global behavior of the system, and the use
of only one of them may cause the loss of some impor-
tant information.
5 The SQLB Framework
We now present SQLB, a flexible framework for bal-
ancing queries while considering the participants’ in-
tentions. A salient feature of SQLB is that it affords
consumers the flexibility to trade their preferences for
the providers’ reputation (Section 5.1) and providers
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Fig. 2 Tradeoff between preference and utilization for getting providers’ intention.
the flexibility to trade their preferences for their utiliza-
tion (Section 5.2). Then, a mediator allocates queries in
accordance to the intentions and satisfaction of par-
ticipants (Section 5.3). In this way, SQLB continu-
ously adapts to changes in participants’ expectations
and workload. Without any loss of generality, partici-
pants may differently obtain their intentions.
5.1 Consumer’s Side
When a consumer is required by the mediator to give its
intention for allocating its query q to a given provider
p, it computes its intention based on its preferences to-
wards p and p’s reputation. The idea is that a consumer
makes a balance between its preferences for allocating
queries and the providers’ reputation, in accordance to
its past experience with providers. For example, if a
consumer does not have any past experience with a
provider p, it pays more attention to the reputation
of p. A consumer may base its preferences on different
criterias, such as quality of service, response times or
price of services. Hence, several ways to compute prefer-
ences exist. Dealing with the way in which a consumer
obtains its preferences is beyond the scope of this paper.
We formally define the intention of a consumer
c ∈ C to allocate its query q to a given provider p ∈ Pq
as in Definition 11. Function prfc(q, p) gives c’s pref-
erence (which may denote e.g. some interest to quality
of service or response time) for allocating q to p, and
function rep(p) gives the reputation of p. Values of both
functions (prf and rep) are in the interval [−1..1].
Definition 11 Consumer’s Intention
cic(q, p) =
prfc(q, p)
υ
× rep(p)1−υ if prfc(q, p) > 0
∧ rep(p) > 0
−
“`
1− prfc(q, p) + ǫ
´υ
×
`
1− rep(p) + ǫ
´1−υ”
else
Parameter ǫ > 0, usually set to 1, prevents the
consumer’s intention from taking zero values when the
consumer’s preference or provider’s reputation values
are equal to 1. Parameter υ ∈ [0..1] ensures a balance
between the consumer’s preferences and the providers’
reputation. In particular, if υ = 1 (resp. 0) the con-
sumer only takes into account its preferences (resp. the
provider’s reputation) to allocate its query. So, if a con-
sumer has enough experience with a given provider p,
it sets υ > 0.5, or else it sets υ < 0.5. When υ = 0.5, it
means that a consumer gives the same importance to
its preferences and the provider’s reputation.
5.2 Provider’s Side
The provider’s intention to perform a given query is
based on its preferences for performing such a query
and its current utilization. Nonetheless, the question
that arises is: what is more important for a provider,
its preferences or its utilization? We propose to bal-
ance, on the fly, the preferences and utilization of a
provider according to its satisfaction. Intuitively, on the
one hand, if a provider is satisfied, it can then accept
sometimes queries that do not meet its expectations.
On the other hand, if a provider is dissatisfied, it does
not pay so much attention to its utilization and focuses
on its preferences so as to obtain queries that meet its
expectations. To do so, the satisfaction it uses to make
the balance has to be based on its preferences and not
on its intentions. Thus, the satisfaction definition of
Section 3.2.2 has to be adapted to the preferences of
a provider by using its preferences instead of its inten-
tions. As for a consumer, a provider may compute its
preferences either by considering its context or indepen-
dently of its context. For example, a provider may no
longer desire to perform some kind of queries when it is
overutilized and another provider may always have the
same preferences for queries no matter its utilization. In
fact, several strategies can be adopted by a provider to
compute its preferences. However, how a provider im-
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plements its preference’s function, prf, is out of scope of
this paper. We just assume that providers’ preferences
are in the interval [−1..1].
We define the intention of a provider p ∈ Pq to deal
with a given query q as in Definition 12. Parameter ǫ >
0, usually set to 1, prevents the intention of a provider
from taking 0 values when its preference is equal to 1
whatever its utilization is.
Definition 12 Provider’s Intention
pip(q) =
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
˛
prfp(q)
1−δs(p) × (1− Ut(p))δs(p), if prfp(q) > 0
∧ Ut(p) < 1
−
“`
1− prfp(q) + ǫ
´1−δs(p)
×
`
Ut(p) + ǫ
´δs(p)” else
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior that function pi
takes for different provider’s satisfaction values. We can
observe in Figure 2(a) that when a provider is not sat-
isfied at all, its utilization has no importance for it
and its preferences denote its intentions. In contrast,
when a provider is completely satisfied, its utilization
denotes its intentions (see Figure 2(b)). In the case that
a provider has a satisfaction of 0.5 (Figure 2(c)), we ob-
serve that its preferences and utilization have the same
importance for it. Moreover, we can observe in Fig-
ure 2 that a provider shows positive intentions, what-
ever its satisfaction is, only when it is not overutilized
and queries are of its interests. This helps satisfying
providers while keeping good response times.
5.3 Mediator’s Side
So far, we assumed that a matchmaking technique has
found the set of providers that are able to deal with a
query q, denoted by set Pq. Therefore, we only focus
on the allocation of q among set Pq. Given a query q,
SQLB allows the mediator to trade consumers’ inten-
tions for providers’ intentions according to their satis-
faction (Section 5.3.1). Furthermore, SQLB affords the
mediator the flexibility to regulate the system w.r.t.
some predefined function and adapt the query allo-
cation process to the application by varying several
parameters (Section 5.3.2). In Section 5.3.3, we de-
scribe the query allocation process and analyze, in Sec-
tion 5.3.4, the number of messages that the mediator
transfers over the network to perform q.
5.3.1 Scoring and ranking providers
A natural way to perform query allocation is to allocate
queries in a consumer-centric fashion, such as several
e-commerce applications do. This leads to take into ac-
count the consumers’ intentions only, which may seems
correct at first glance. However, doing so may severely
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Fig. 3 The values that parameter ω can take.
penalize providers’ intentions and hence it may cause
their departure from the mediator, which implies a loss
of capacity and functionality of the system but also
a loss of revenues for the mediator when it is paid by
providers after each transaction (e.g. in ebay sellers pay
a percent of the transactions they conclude). Respec-
tively, if a mediator only considers the providers’ inten-
tions when allocating queries, consumers may quit the
mediator by dissatisfaction, which in turn may cause
the departure of providers. This is why we decide to
balance consumers’ and providers’ intentions with the
aim that both of them be satisfied.
Thus, given a query q, a provider is scored by con-
sidering both its intention for performing q and q.c’s
intention for allocating q to it. That is, the score of a
provider p ∈ Pq regarding a given query q is defined
as the balance between the q.c’s and p’s intentions (see
Definition 13).
Definition 13 Provider’s Score
scrq(p) =
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
`−→
PIq [p]
´ω`−→
CIq [p]
´1−ω
if
−→
PIq[p] > 0∧
∧
−→
CIq[p] > 0
−
“`
1−
−→
PIq[p] + ǫ
´ω`
1−
−→
CIq [p] + ǫ
´1−ω”
else
Vector
−→
PIq[p] denotes Pq’s intentions to perform
q. Parameter ǫ > 0, usually set to 1, prevents the
provider’s score from taking 0 values when the con-
sumer or provider’s intention is equal to 1. Parameter
ω ∈ [0..1] ensures a balance between the consumer’s in-
tention for allocating its query and the provider’s inten-
tion for performing such a query. In other words, it re-
flects the importance that the query allocation method
gives to the consumer and providers’ intentions. To
guarantee equity at all levels, such a balance should be
done in accordance to the consumer and providers’ sat-
isfaction. That is, if the consumer is more satisfied than
the provider, then the query allocation method should
pay more attention to the provider’s intentions. Thus,
we compute the ω value as in Equation 7. Conversely
to provider’s intention, the query allocation module has
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not access to private information. Thus, the satisfaction
it uses must be based on the intentions.
ω =
((
δs(c)− δs(p)
)
+ 1
)/
2 (7)
Figure 3 illustrates the tradeoff between the con-
sumer and provider’ intention for obtaining the ω value.
One can also set ω’s value according to the kind of
application. For instance, if providers are cooperative
(i.e. not selfish) and the most important is to ensure
the quality of results, one can set ω near or equal to
0. Finally, providers are ranked from the best to the
worst scored, the
−→
R q vector. Intuitively,
−→
R q[1] is the
best scored provider to deal with q,
−→
R q[2] the second,
and so on up to
−→
R q[N ] which is the worst. As a result,
if q.n <= N the q.n best ranked providers are selected,
or else all the N providers are selected.
5.3.2 Regulating the system
The mediator can proceed to allocate queries by consid-
ering only the providers’ ranking based on their score
(
−→
R ), which affords participants to take the control of
the query allocation process. However, the mediator
may have certain objectives or goals that it aims to
achieve. It is possible that the mediator wants to regu-
late the system regarding some predefined function τ ,
e.g. to ensure short response times to consumers. To al-
low this, we assume that the mediator uses the KnBest
strategy that we proposed in [31]. KnBest is inspired
by the two random choices (TRC) paradigm [25,6]. The
idea is that, given a query q, the mediator selects a set
Kn of kn providers that either maximize or minimize
function τ from set K, where set K is a random se-
lection of k′ providers from set Pq of providers
3. Then,
it allocates q to the q.n best ranked providers among
set Kn of providers. We explain further the query al-
location principle in Section 5.3.3. We assume, without
any loss of generality, that function τ denotes function
U, which means that the mediator strives to regulate
the system with respect to providers’ utilization (i.e. to
perform qlb).
Theorem 1 summarizes the KnBest’s properties
that bound its behavior.
Theorem 1 Given a query q, the behavior of a query
allocation method using KnBest is bounded by the fol-
lowing properties,
(i) if k′ = 2q.n ∧ kn = q.n, KnBest has a TRC behav-
ior.
3 We can indifferently assume that k′ and kn values are prede-
fined by the administrator or defined on the fly by the mediator.
(ii) if k′ = Nq ∧ kn = q.n, KnBest has a Capacity ba-
sed behavior.
(iii) if k′ = Nq ∧ kn = k′, KnBest has an Intention ba-
sed behavior.
Proof Say a query allocation method qa implements
the KnBest strategy. The following is the same for any
value that parameter q.n can take.
Consider that qa sets k′ = 2q.n ∧ kn = q.n. In this
case, qa allocates a query q to the less utilized provider
p ∈ P among a set of 2q.n random selected providers
from Pq. This leads to satisfy the below equation,
∀p ∈ P̂q, ∄p
′ ∈ K\P̂q : U(p′) < U(p)
which is also ensured by a query allocation method us-
ing a TRC process. This proves property (i).
Now, consider that qa sets k′ = Nq ∧ kn = q.n. In
this case, qa allocates an incoming query q to the less
utilized providers in set Pq, which is also the objective
of a Capacity based method. Thus, both qa and Capa-
city based ensure the following equation,
∀p ∈ P̂q, ∄p
′ ∈ Pq\P̂q : U(p′) < U(p)
which proves property (ii).
Finally, consider that qa sets k′ = Nq ∧ kn = k
′.
Doing so, an incoming query q is allocated by qa to a
set P̂q such that,
∀p ∈ P̂q, ∄p
′ ∈ Pq\P̂q : scrq(p
′) > scrq(p)
Thus, the only thing that is considered by qa is the
participants’ intentions and thus it will have an In-
tention based behavior. In other words, the mediator
has no control to regulate the system. We call this way
to operate the intention based approach. This proves
property (iii). ⊓⊔
The great advantage of using KnBest is that it al-
lows the mediator to adapt the query allocation process
to the application by varying several parameters. To il-
lustrate this, consider the following examples. First, if
providers and incoming queries are homogeneous, the
mediator can take a TRC behavior (which has been
proved to operate well in homogeneous distributed sys-
tems [25]) when allocating queries by setting param-
eters of KnBest as in property (i). Second example,
consider that providers and incoming queries are het-
erogeneous and that the most important is to perform
qlb with no consideration for participants’ intentions.
In this case, the mediator can allocate queries following
a Capacity based behavior, by setting parameters of
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KnBest as in property (ii). Finally, consider that par-
ticipants are autonomous and there is no other objec-
tive in the system than satisfying participants, the me-
diator can then allocate queries based only on the par-
ticipants’ intentions by setting parameters of KnBest
as in property (iii).
In the rest of this paper, as we focus on heteroge-
neous distributed information systems, we assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that k′ is always equal to N (i.e.
we discard the random selection phase).
5.3.3 Query allocation principle
We now describe how the mediator allocates queries.
Figure 4 illustrates the general SQLB system architec-
ture and Algorithm 1 shows the main steps of the query
allocation process. Given a query q and a set Pq of
providers that are able to perform q, the mediator first
asks for q.c’s intention for allocating q to each provider
p ∈ Pq (line 2 of Algorithm 1). In parallel, it also asks
for Pq’s utilization (with the assumption that function
τ denotes function U) and intention for performing q
(lines 3 and 4). Then, it waits for this information from
both q.c and set Pq or for a given timeout (line 5). Once
such vectors
−→
CIq,
−→
U , and
−→
PIq are computed (where
−→
U
stores the utilization of each provider in Pq), the me-
diator selects the kn less utilized providers, denoted by
set Kn, from set Pq (line 6). This selection phase can
Algorithm 1: QueryAllocation
Input : q, kn, Pq
Output: All−→ocq
begin1
// Consumer’s intentions
fork ask for q.c’s intentions;2
// Providers’ intention
foreach p ∈ Pq do3
fork ask for p’s utilization and intention w.r.t. q ;4
waituntil
−→
CIq,
−→
U , and
−→
PIq be calculated or timeout ;5
// qlb regulation
Kn ← select kn less utilized providers from set Pq ;6
// Scoring and ranking providers
foreach p ∈ Kn do7
compute p’s score concerning
−→
CIq[p] &
−→
PIq [p] ;8
rank set Kn of providers regarding scrp(q),
−→
R q ;9
// Query Allocation
for i = 1 to min(n, kn) do All
−→oc [
−→
Rq [i]]← 1 ;10
for j = min(n, kn) + 1 to N do All
−→oc [
−→
Rq[j]]← 0 ;11
end12
be solved using a sorting algorithm, so, in the worst
case, its complexity is O
(
N log2(N)
)
. Next, the me-
diator computes the score of each provider p ∈ Kn
by making a balance between q.c’s and p’s intentions
(line 7 and 8) and computes the ranking of providers in
Kn (line 9), whose complexity is O
(
kn log2(kn)
)
in the
worst case. Finally, the mediator allocates q to the q.n
best scored providers in set Kn and sends the media-
tion result to all Pq providers (lines 10 and 11). Notice
that in the case that q.n ≥ kn, the mediator thus allo-
cates q to all kn providers. Indeed, Algorithm 1 can be
optimized, but our goal is to show the steps involved in
the query allocation process.
5.3.4 Communication Cost
We analyze communication cost in terms of number of
messages that the mediator should transfer over the
network to perform a query. The communication cost
is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The total number of transferred messages
by the mediator to perform a query is 3(N + 1) + n.
Proof As we saw in the previous section, given any in-
coming query q, the mediator transfersmssg0 = 2N+2
messages over the network to ask the consumer’s inten-
tions and the utilization and intention of providers in
set Pq. Then, it selects the kn least utilized providers in
set Pq and allocates q to the q.n best scored providers
in set Kn. After this, the mediator informs all providers
in set Pq of the mediation result and waits for results
from the q.n selected providers. This implies to ex-
change mssg1 = N + n messages among the mediator
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and participants, where n stands for q.n. Finally, the
mediator transfers mssg2 = 1 messages to give results
to q.c. Thus, the total number of messages transferred
over the network by the mediator to perform a query is
mssg0 +mssg1 +mssg2 = 3(N + 1) + n. ⊓⊔
We can further reduce the number of messages
by using participants’ representatives [18] or by in-
troducing again the random selection phase (see Sec-
tion 5.3.2). However, the problem of reducing commu-
nication cost is orthogonal to the problem we address
in this paper.
5.4 Discussion
We pointed out in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 that there exist
several ways a participant can compute its preferences.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no work that
proposes a comparison study of these different prefer-
ence functions and hence it is still an open problem. We
believe that such a study may be quite interesting to
allow a participant knowing which strategy it can adopt
to compute its preferences. Similarly, several manners
to compute the consumers’ and providers’ intentions
exist. This is also an open problem that should be ex-
plored so as to identify the best ways for a participant
to adapt their intentions to their context and applica-
tion. Improving on these functions is not the focus of
our work. Instead, our framework is designed so it can
leverage any existing preference and intention function.
Moreover, the score function of a query allocation
method is usually based on specific demands, which are
given by the application challenges that one wants to
solve. Thus, a large number of specific query allocation
methods with different behaviors may exist. For exam-
ple, the score function of a qlb method is designed for
those applications whose goal is to ensure good system
performance. However, when the behavior of a query al-
location method is specific to an application, it cannot
be applied elsewhere, and worse, it cannot perform in
environments where participants change their interests
on the fly.
Therefore, we proposed a score function that makes
no assumption about either the kind of application nor
the way in which a participant obtains its preferences.
It just allocates queries based on the participants’ in-
tentions. But, we are aware that sometimes a media-
tor, or even the system administrator, is required to
satisfy some constraint, e.g. to ensure a specific Qual-
ity of Service, no matter what the participants prefer.
This is why we also proposed a strategy that allows the
query allocation method to regulate the system with
regards to a given function. As a result, conversely to
specific query allocation methods, SQLB is quite gen-
eral, self-adaptable to the interests of participants, and
adaptable to the application. This allows SQLB to per-
form in many kinds of environments and to perform as
well as any specific query allocation method by tuning
its parameters or if participants desire so.
We assumed a mono-mediator system, i.e. a sys-
tem that contains only one mediator to allocate queries.
Clearly, a mediator may become a single point of fail-
ure and a performance bottleneck and thus one may
desire to have more than one mediator in the system
to allocate queries. In this case, SQLB does not scale
well because it considers current participants’ satisfac-
tion, which a mediator can no longer compute itself as
it also depends on the query allocations made by other
mediators. Hence, when allocating a query, a mediator
should keep informed all other mediators of the medi-
ation result to update participants’ satisfaction. This
tends to significantly increase the network traffic. A
way to avoid such a traffic overhead between media-
tors is that providers express their interest for queries
through “monetary” bids so that mediators no longer
consider the providers’ satisfaction but only their bids.
This requires introducing some “virtual” money to be
used by providers and mediators. In this context, we are
currently doing some work to show how to adapt SQLB
to use virtual money and demonstrate that such an eco-
nomic version can easily scale up to several mediators.
However, a further discussion on this subject is not the
focus of this paper (see [33,34]).
Finally, in large-scale distributed information sys-
tems participants may fail, usually because of net-
work failures. Nevertheless, we do not deal with fault-
tolerance issues in this paper since the main focus of
this work is to evaluate SQLB from a satisfaction point
of view. To make SQLB fault-tolerant is the focus of
one of our forthcoming work. Generally speaking, the
idea is to enable a mediator to set, in a predictive way,
the number of replicas that should be created for an
incoming query based on participants’ satisfaction.
6 Experimental Validation
Our experimental validation has three main objectives:
(i) to evaluate how well query allocation methods oper-
ate, (ii) to analyze if SQLB satisfies participants while
ensures good qlb because it is not obvious that when
adding new criteria a query allocation method still gives
good results for the initial criteria, and (iii) to study
how well our measures capture query allocation meth-
ods’ operation. To do so, we carry out four kinds of
evaluations. First, we evaluate the general query alloca-
tion process as well as the computed measures. Second,
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we evaluate the impact of participants’ autonomy on
performance. Third, we evaluate the self-adaptability
of SQLB to participants’ expectations. Finally, we an-
alyze the effects of varying the values of kn parameter,
i.e. we evaluate the SQLB’s adaptability to different
kinds of applications.
6.1 Setup
We built a Java-based simulator and simulate a mono-
mediator distributed information system, which follows
the mediation system architecture presented in [18]. For
all the query allocation methods we tested, the follow-
ing configuration (Table 2) is the same and the only
change is the way in which each method allocates the
queries to providers. Before defining our experimen-
tal setup let us say that the definition of a synthetic
workload for environments where participants are au-
tonomous and have special interests towards queries is
an open problem. Pieper et al. [29] discuss the need of
benchmarks for scenario-oriented cases, which are sim-
ilar to the case we consider, but this remains an open
problem. Another possibility to validate our results is to
consider real-world data over long periods of time. How-
ever, even if we had (we don’t) the resources to obtain
real-world data, the validation would get biased towards
the specific applications. Therefore, in our experiments,
we decided to generate a very general workload that can
be applied for different applications and environments
in order to thoroughly validate our results.
Participants work out their satisfaction, adequa-
tion, and allocation satisfaction as presented in Sec-
tion 3. We initialize them with a satisfaction value of
0.5, which evolves with their last 200 issued queries and
500 queries that have passed through providers. That is,
the size of k is 200 for consumers and 500 for providers.
The number of consumers and providers is 200 and 400
respectively, with only one mediator allocating all the
incoming queries. We assign sufficient resources to the
mediator so that it does not cause bottlenecks in the
system. We assume that consumers and providers com-
pute their intentions as defined in Sections 5.1 and 5.2,
respectively. For simplicity, we set υ = 1, i.e. the con-
sumers’ preferences denote their intentions.
To simulate high heterogeneity of the consumers’
preferences for allocating their queries to providers, we
divide the set of providers into three classes according
to the interest of consumers: to those that consumers
have high interest (60% of providers), medium interest
(30% of providers), and low interest (10% of providers).
Consumers randomly obtain their preferences between
.34 and 1 for high-interest providers, between −.54
and .34 for medium-interest providers, and between −1
Table 2 Simulation parameters.
Parameter Definition Value
nbConsumers Number of consumers 200
nbProviders Number of providers 400
nbMediators Number of mediators 1
qDistribution Query arrival distribution Poisson
iniSatisfaction Initial satisfaction 0.5
conSatSize k last issued queries 200
proSatSize k last treated queries 500
nbRepeat Repetition of simulations 10
and −.54 for low -interest providers. On the other side,
to simulate high heterogeneity of the providers’ pref-
erences towards the incoming queries, we also create
three classes of providers: those that have high adap-
tation (35% of providers), medium adaptation (60% of
providers), and low adaptation(5% of providers). Here,
adaptation stands for the system-provider adequation
notion we defined in Section 3.2.1. Providers randomly
obtain their preferences between −.2 and 1 (high-
adaptation), between −.6 and .6 (medium-adaptation)
or between −1 and .2 (low -adaptation). More sophisti-
cated mechanisms for obtaining such preferences can be
applied (for example using the Rush language [37]), but
this is beyond the scope of this paper and orthogonal to
the problem we address here. Without any loss of gen-
erality, the participants’ expectations, in the long run,
are static in our simulations. We assume this to evalu-
ate the query allocation methods in a long-run trend,
but our model allows expectations to be dynamic.
We set the providers’ capacity heterogeneity follow-
ing the results presented in [39]. We generate around
10% of providers with low -capacity, 60% with medium,
and 30% with high. The high-capacity providers are 3
times more powerful than medium-capacity and still 7
times more powerful than low -capacity providers. We
generate two classes of queries that consume, respec-
tively, 130 and 150 treatment units at the high-capacity
providers.High-capacity providers perform both classes
of queries in almost 1.3 and 1.5 seconds, respectively.
We consider in our experiments, without any loss of
generality, that providers offer computational services
to consumers. Thus, inspired from [12], we assume that
providers compute their utilization as in Equation 8.
Set Qp denotes the set of queries that have been allo-
cated to p but have not already been treated, i.e. the
pending queries at p. Function costp(q) represents the
computational resources that a query q ∈ Qp consumes
at provider p.
Ut(p) =
∑
q∈Qp
costp(q)
cap(p)
(8)
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We do not consider the random selection phase be-
cause we consider heterogeneous distributed systems.
In other words, we assume in all our experimentations
that k′ is equal to N . We assume that queries arrive to
the system in a Poisson distribution, as found in dy-
namic autonomous environments [22]. Since our main
focus is to study the way in which queries are allocated,
we do not consider in this paper the bandwidth problem
and assume that all participants have the same network
capacities. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, we assume
that consumers only ask for one informational answer
(i.e. n = 1) and all the providers in the system are able
to perform all the incoming queries.
6.2 Baseline Methods
We briefly justify, in this section, the choice of the al-
gorithms to which we compare SQLB.
6.2.1 Capacity based method
In distributed information systems, there are two well-
known approaches to balance queries across providers:
Load Based and Capacity based methods. We discard
Load Based [12,6] methods since, unlike Capacity ba-
sed, they inherently assume that providers and queries
are homogeneous. In Capacity based [24,35,40] meth-
ods, one common approach is to allocate each query
q to providers that have the highest available capacity
(i.e. the least utilized) among set Pq of providers.Capa-
city based has been shown to be better than Load Ba-
sed in heterogeneous distributed information systems.
Thus, we use Capacity based in our simulations. Note
that Capacity based does not take into account the
consumers nor providers’ intentions.
6.2.2 Economical method
Economical models have been shown to provide efficient
query allocation in heterogeneous systems [9,10,42].
Mariposa [42] is one of the most important approaches
to allocate queries in autonomous environments. In this
approach, all the incoming queries are processed by a
broker site that requests providers for bids. Providers
bid for obtaining queries based on a local bulletin board
and then the broker selects the set of bids that has an
aggregate price and delay under a bid curve provided
by the consumer. In Mariposa, providers modify their
bids with their current load (i.e. bid × load) in order
to ensure qlb. Since Mariposa has shown good results,
we implemented a Mariposa-like method to compare
it with SQLB. In our Mariposa-like implementation
we assume that consumers are only interested in the
price for getting results. Note that different economical
methods may lead to different performance results than
those presented here.
6.3 Results
We start, in Section 6.3.1, by evaluating the quality of
the three query allocation methods with regards to sat-
isfaction and qlb. In Section 6.3.2, we evaluate how well
these methods deal with the possible participants’ de-
parture by dissatisfaction, starvation, or overutilization.
Then, in Section 6.3.3, we show the self-adaptability of
SQLB to participants’ expectations. In these three first
sections, we assume that kn = k
′, i.e. setKn denotes set
Pq considering that k
′ = N . Finally, in Section 6.3.4,
we study the adaptability of SQLB to the kind of ap-
plication by varying parameter kn.
6.3.1 Quality results without autonomy
If participants are autonomous, they may leave the sys-
tem by dissatisfaction, starvation, or overutilization.
Nevertheless, the choice of such departure’s thresholds
is very subjective and may depend on several external
factors. Thus, for these first experiments, we consider
captive participants, i.e. they are not allowed to leave
the system. To measure the quality of the three meth-
ods, we apply the measures defined in Section 4. We
ran a series of experiments where each one starts with
a workload of 30% that uniformly increases up to 100%
of the total system capacity.
We first analyze the providers results. Figure 5(a)
shows the satisfaction mean ensured by the three meth-
ods. The satisfaction used in this measurement is based
on the providers’ intentions, i.e. what the mediator can
see. We observe in these results that providers are more
satisfied with SQLB than with the two others. As the
workload increases, providers’ satisfaction decreases be-
cause their intentions decrease as they are loaded (just
because utilization becomes the most important for
them). Thus, SQLB cannot satisfy the providers’ inten-
tions for high workloads since their adequation (based
on intentions) is low. Capacity based andMariposa-like
do not satisfy the providers’ intentions from the be-
ginning, simply because they allocate queries based on
other criteria, which do not exactly meet intention.
Nonetheless, this does not reflect what providers
really feel with respect to their preferences. To show
this, we need to measure the mean ensured by the
three methods concerning the providers’ satisfaction
based on their preferences. Although we can measure
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(a) Providers’ satisfaction mean based on
intentions.
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(b) Providers’ satisfaction mean based on
preferences.
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(c) Providers’ allocation satisfaction.
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(d) Provider satisfaction fairness.
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(e) Consumers’ allocation satisfaction.
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(f) Consumer satisfaction fairness.
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(g) Query load mean.
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(h) Query load fairness.
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(i) Query load min-max.
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(j) Allocation efficiency w.r.t. Consumers.
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(k) Allocation efficiency w.r.t. Providers.
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(l) Response times.
Fig. 5 Results with captive participants. (a)-(i): quality results for a workload range from 30 to 100% of the total system capacity,
(j)-(k): allocation efficiency results for different workloads, and (l): ensured response times for different workloads.
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such a satisfaction in our simulations, this is not al-
ways possible since such preferences are usually consid-
ered as private. Figure 5(b) shows the results of these
measurements. We observe that SQLB has the same
performance as Mariposa-like even if it considers the
consumers’ intentions. When the workload is close to
100%, the providers’ satisfaction slightly decreases with
SQLB. As noted earlier, this is because providers pay
more attention to their utilization for obtaining their
intentions, thus their preferences are less considered by
the SQLB method.
It is worth noting that, as expected, Capacity based
is the only one among these three methods that penal-
izes the providers. This is clear in Figure 5(c), which
illustrates the mean ensured by these three methods
with respect to the providers’ allocation satisfaction.
We observe that providers are not satisfied with Ca-
pacity based having, in general, allocation satisfaction
values under 1. Then, based on these results, we can
predict that when providers will be free to leave the sys-
tem, Capacity based will suffer from serious problems
with providers’ departures by dissatisfaction reasons.
Figure 5(d) illustrates the satisfaction fairness ensured
by the three methods. We see that they guarantee al-
most the same satisfaction fairness. However, as seen in
the previous results, this does not mean that providers
are satisfied with all three methods.
Now, let us analyze the consumer results. Fig-
ure 5(e) illustrates the allocation satisfaction mean
concerning the consumers’ intentions. We observe that
while SQLB is the only one to satisfy consumers, the
two others are neutral to consumers (mean values equal
to 1). These results allows us to predict that Capaci-
ty based and Mariposa-like may suffer from consumer’s
departures while SQLB does not. The SQLB’s mean
decreases for high workloads because of providers. Re-
member that providers’ satisfaction decrease because
they take care of their utilization. So, SQLB pays more
attention to providers’ satisfaction than to consumers’
satisfaction. Nonetheless, consumers are never penal-
ized! Conversely to providers, we can observe in Fig-
ure 5(f) that consumers’ satisfaction fairness has less
variations because they are not in direct competition
to allocate queries.
Concerning qlb, as expected, Capacity based better
balances the queries among providers than SQLB and
Mariposa-like (see Figure 5(g)). We can observe that
SQLB performs well, while Mariposa-like has serious
problems to balance queries. Thus, Mariposa-like may
lose providers by starvation or overutilization reasons.
Figure 5(h) shows that SQLB has some difficulties to
be fair (w.r.t. qlb) for workloads under 40%. In contrast,
when the workload increases, SQLB pays more atten-
tion to qlb and becomes fairer. This is clearly illustrated
in Figure 5(i), which shows the results about the utiliza-
tion Min-Max. The reason that SQLB performs better
for high workloads is that providers become overutilized
and thus they take much more care with their utiliza-
tion, which is not the case for low workloads. These qlb
results demonstrate the high adaptability of SQLB to
the variations in the workloads.
Figures 5(j) and 5(k) illustrate the allocation ef-
ficiency with respect to consumers and providers for
different workloads. These results clearly illustrate
the superiority of SQLB over Capacity based and
Mariposa-like since we can observe, (i) on the one hand,
that SQLB significantly outperforms Capacity based
in both cases; and (ii) on the other hand, that SQLB
and Mariposa-like have the same allocation efficiency
w.r.t. providers, but SQLB significantly outperforms
Mariposa-like in the consumers’ case, which demon-
strates the equity at both levels of SQLB.
Finally, Figure 5(l) shows the ensured response
times in these environments (with captive participants).
As is conventional, response time is defined as the
elapsed time from the moment that a query q is is-
sued to the moment that q.c receives the response of
q. As expected, the Capacity based method outper-
forms the two others. However, even if SQLB takes
into account the participants’ intentions, it only de-
grades performance by a factor of 1.4 in average while
Mariposa-like does so by a factor of 3!
All above results show that Capacity based may
severely suffer from providers’ departures by dissat-
isfaction, while Mariposa-like may also suffer from
providers’ departures by query starvation or overuti-
lization. Furthermore, above results demonstrate the
SQLB’s self-adaptability to changes in the partici-
pants’ satisfaction and to the workload. This feature
makes our proposal highly suitable for autonomous en-
vironments. Furthermore, as concluding remark, we can
say that even if not designed for environments where
participants are captive, SQLB ensures quite good re-
sponse times and pays attention to the quality of results
and queries that consumers and providers get from the
system, respectively.
6.3.2 Dealing with autonomy
To validate our measurements and intuitions of Sec-
tion 6.3.1, we also ran several experimental simulations
where participants are given the autonomy to leave
the system. Our main goal, in this section, is to study
the reasons by which providers leave the system and
evaluate the impact on performance. We evaluate the
ensured response times by the three methods in au-
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(a) Providers may leave by dissatisfaction.
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(b) Providers may leave by dissatisfaction
or starvation.
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(c) Providers may leave by dissatisfaction,
starvation, or overutilization.
Fig. 6 Impact on performance of providers’ departures.
tonomous environments and compare it with those of
the captive environments (see Figure 5(l)).
To do so, we have to set the thresholds under, or
over, which a participant decides to leave the system.
To avoid any suspicion on the choice of such thresh-
olds, we assume that participants support high degrees
of dissatisfaction, starvation, and overutilization. Thus,
a consumer leaves the system, by dissatisfaction, if its
satisfaction is smaller than its adequation, i.e. the allo-
cation method penalizes it. A provider leaves the sys-
tem (i) by dissatisfaction, if its satisfaction value is 0.15
smaller than its adequation, (ii) by starvation, if its uti-
lization is smaller than 20% of its optimal utilization,
and (iii) by overutilization, if its utilization is greater
than 220% of its optimal utilization. With a workload
of 80% of the total system capacity, the optimal utiliza-
tion of a provider is 0.8.
We ran a first series of experiments with different
workloads where providers are allowed to leave the sys-
tem by dissatisfaction only (see Figure 6(a)). We can
see that our approach outperforms bothCapacity based
and Mariposa-like because it better satisfies providers
than Capacity based, and better ensures qlb in the sys-
tem than Mariposa-like . Recall that in previous section
we note that Mariposa-like tends to overutilize some
providers (those that are the most adapted to the in-
coming queries). This is why, even if Mariposa-like bet-
ter satisfies providers than Capacity based (see Fig-
ure 5(b)), it ensures higher response times than Capa-
city based.
A second series of experiments allows providers to
leave the system by dissatisfaction or starvation. A
provider might quit the system by starvation e.g. when
it simply does not obtain the queries that it needs to
survive. Figure 6(b) illustrates these results. We ob-
serve again that SQLB significantly outperforms the
other two methods for all workloads and that its per-
formance is almost the same than last series of ex-
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Fig. 7 Providers’ departures.
periments, which means that SQLB generally does
not suffer from starvation departures. Furthermore,
we can see that Capacity based better performs than
Mariposa-like because it better balances the query load
than Mariposa-like . As previous series of experiments,
this is because Capacity based ensures a better qlb in
the system.
Also, we run a series of experiments where providers
are allowed to leave the system by dissatisfaction, star-
vation, or overutilization. A provider may quit the sys-
tem by overutilization if this implies for example a loss
of business for it, e.g. when overutilization deteriorates
the quality of service provided by a provider and con-
sumers are interested in good quality of services. This
results are illustrated by Figure 6(c). We observe that
while SQLB and Mariposa-like degrade their perfor-
mance only by a factor of 1.4 in average (w.r.t. Fig-
ure 5(l)), Capacity based does it by a factor of 3.5!
Figure 7 shows the number of provider’s departures
with the three methods. We observe that, except for
a workload of 20%, Capacity based and Mariposa-like
lose almost all the providers for all workloads. Note
that SQLB only loses 28% of providers in average!
This demonstrates the high efficiency of SQLB in au-
tonomous environments.
20
Table 3 Provider’s departures reasons for a workload of 80% of the total system capacity.
SQLB Capacity based Mariposa-like
low med high total low med high total low med high total
Cons. Interest to Prov. 1% 5% 13% 5% 16% 31% 1% 7% 11%
Dissat. Providers’ Adequation 2% 9% 8% 19% 3% 34% 15% 52% 0% 15% 4% 19%
Providers’ Capacity 13% 6% 0% 13% 30% 9% 5% 12% 2%
low med high total low med high total low med high total
Cons. Interest to Prov. 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 6%
Starv. Providers’ Adequation 4% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 2% 8%
Providers’ Capacity 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% 0%
low med high total low med high total low med high total
Cons. Interest to Prov. 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 38% 0% 0% 65%
Overuti. Providers’ Adequation 0% 3% 3% 6% 3% 8% 27% 38% 1% 15% 49% 65%
Providers’ Capacity 1% 4% 1% 0% 18% 20% 0% 30% 35%
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Fig. 8 Consumers’ departures.
We show, in Table 3, an analysis of providers’ rea-
sons to leave the system when the workload is 80%. We
observe that, as predicted in Section 6.3.1, providers
leave the system with Capacity based because of dis-
satisfaction, while they do so because of overutilization
withMariposa-like . Furthermore, the providers that de-
cide to leave in both methods are mainly those that are
the most adapted to incoming queries and that con-
sumers desire the most. With SQLB, providers leave
the system by dissatisfaction, but such providers are
mainly those that are low -capacity. In fact, we can see
that SQLB mainly maintains the high-interest, high-
adaptation, and high-capacity providers in the system.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the consumers’ departure by
dissatisfaction with these three methods. Again, SQLB
is a clear winner with no consumer’s departures! Note
that, the consumer’s departures have also a direct im-
pact on performance since the less the incoming queries,
the less the chances for satisfying providers.
6.3.3 Adaptability to participants’ interests
Our objective in this section is to study how well SQLB
adapts to different participants’ intentions. With this in
mind, we consider again captive environments such as
in Section 6.3.1. For simplicity, we evaluate in this pa-
per providers with two different intentions: those that
are only interested in their preferences (the preference-
based case), i.e. the providers’ preferences denote their
intentions, and those that are only interested in their
load (the utilization-based case), i.e. providers compute
their intentions based on their utilization. Consumers
work out their intentions regarding the providers’ ca-
pacity to perform queries, such as in previous sections.
We compare results of SQLB in both cases with those
obtained in the normal case, i.e. when providers make
a balance between their preferences and utilization to
compute their intentions, such as in Section 6.3.1.
Figure 9 shows the results of these experiments with
a workload range from 30 to 100% of the total system
capacity. We can observe in Figures 9(a) and 9(b) that
the results are strongly related to the participants’ ex-
pectations. We can observe in Figure 9(a) that, as ex-
pected, providers are more satisfied in the preference-
based case than in the utilization-based case. But, con-
trary to the expected, providers are less satisfied in the
preference-based case than in the normal case. During
our experimentations, we observed that those providers
with high-adaptation tend to monopolize the queries,
which causes dissatisfaction to the medium and low-
adaptation providers. This phenomenon does not oc-
cur in the normal case because SQLB also considers
the providers’ utilization. This is why providers are in
average less satisfied in the preference-based case than
in the normal case. However, since in the normal case
providers pay more attention to their utilization as
the workload increases, providers have the same degree
of satisfaction, for high workloads, in both preference-
based and normal cases.
In Figure 9(b), we observe that consumers have the
same degree of satisfaction in the three cases, but we
can observe, in the preference-based case, a very small
gain for high workloads. This is because for high work-
loads, providers give more importance to their utiliza-
tion in both utilization-based and normal cases. Hence,
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Fig. 9 Quality results for a workload range from 30 to 100% of the total system capacity when participants are captive and for three
kinds of providers: (i) when they are interested only in their preferences (the preference-based case), (ii) when they are just interested
in their utilization (the utilization-based case), and (iii) when their utilization is as important as their preferences (the normal case).
for high workloads, the query allocation pays more at-
tention to providers and thus the consumers’ satisfac-
tion decreases in these both cases.
Now, concerning qlb, SQLB performs well in
the utilization-based and normal cases while, in the
preference-based case, SQLB significantly degrades the
providers’ utilization because providers have no con-
sideration for qlb. On the other side, observe that, in
the utilization-based case, SQLB follows the behavior
of the Capacity based approach (see Figures 9(a) and
9(c)) with regards to the providers’ results, but it is
much better from a consumer point of view.
All above results allow us to conclude that SQLB
allows participants to obtain from the system what
they want and not what the system considers relevant
for them. In other words, our results demonstrate that
SQLB ensures good levels of satisfaction as far as the
system is adequate to participants and vice versa. Thus,
if the participants correctly work out their intentions,
SQLB allows them to reach their expectations.
6.3.4 Query load balance control
We finally discuss how to adapt SQLB to different ap-
plications by varying parameter kn. To better illustrate
the effects of varying parameter kn (i.e. the regulation
of the system concerning qlb), we consider two kinds
of providers: those that do not have any consideration
for their utilization when they compute their intentions
(the preference-based case), and those that make a bal-
ance of their preferences and their utilization to com-
pute their intentions (the normal case).
For simplicity, we consider only two different appli-
cations in this work: (i) one where ensuring the perfor-
mance of the system is mandatory such as in distributed
databases and (ii) other where participants’ satisfaction
is mandatory and some level of system’s performance
is desired such as in e-commerce scenarios. For the first
kind of application, the mediator should perform qlb
while guaranteeing interesting results and queries to
participants because of their autonomy. For the second
kind of application, the mediator’s priority is to satisfy
providers while ensuring an acceptable system perfor-
mance. To do so, for the first kind of application, the
mediator sets parameter kn = 2 and it sets kn = 10 for
the second one.
To clearly see the impact of parameter kn, we com-
pare both results (i.e. when kn = 2 and kn = 10) with
the case where the mediator has no control to regulate
the system (i.e. when kn = k
′). Notice that the previ-
ous sections assumed that kn = k
′, thus the results of
SQLB in the normal and preference-based cases that
we present in this section are the same as those we
presented in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.3, respectively. We
present them again as references for both two other kn
sizes (kn = 2 and kn = 10).
We can see in Figures 10(a) and 11(a) that for
all three different kn values and both normal and
preference-based cases, providers are generally satisfied
with the job done by our approach, which is not ob-
vious in applications when qlb is the most important
(e.g. the kn = 2 case). Notice that providers are more
satisfied in the normal case as the kn value increases
(see Figure 10(a)), but this is not the case for providers
in the preference-based case when kn = k
′ and kn = 10
(see Figure 11(a)). This is because, as noted in the pre-
vious section, the high-adaptation providers tends to
monopolize the queries when they compute their inten-
tions based only on their preferences, i.e. the preference-
based case. But, when the mediator regulates the system
with respect to qlb, it better distributes queries among
providers and thus avoids, in the preference-based case,
the query starvation in the less adapted providers (i.e.
in the providers with medium and low-adaptation). Of
22
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
A
llo
c.
 S
at
. M
ea
n,
 µ
(δ
a
s,
 
P)
Time (seconds)
kn=k’
kn=2
kn=10
(a) Providers’ allocation satisfaction mean.
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
A
llo
c.
 S
at
. M
ea
n,
 µ
(δ
a
s,
 
C
)
Time (seconds)
kn=k’
kn=2
kn=10
(b) Consumers’ allocation satisfaction
mean.
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
M
ea
n,
 µ
(U
t,
 
P)
Time (seconds)
kn=k’
kn=2
kn=10
(c) Query load mean.
Fig. 10 Quality results for a workload range from 30 to 100% of the total system capacity when participants are captive and providers
compute their intentions based on their preferences and utilization (the normal case).
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Fig. 11 Quality results for a workload range from 30 to 100% of the total system capacity when participants are captive and providers
compute their intentions based on their preferences (the preference-based case).
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(a) When providers’ preferences denote
their intentions (the preference-based case).
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(b) When providers make a balance between
their preferences and utilization to compute
their intentions (the normal case).
Fig. 12 Performance results with captive participants.
course, when kn takes small values the providers are less
satisfied (which is the case of kn = 2) because the medi-
ator pays less attention to the providers’ intentions. In
these cases, however, even if the objective is the same
for both, SQLB performs much better than the Capa-
city based approach because it satisfies both consumers
and providers (see Figures 5(c) and 5(e) for Capaci-
ty based). In fact, we can observe in Figures 10(b) and
11(b) that the regulation of the system has almost no
impact on the consumers, which are equally satisfied
for all kn values.
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Concerning qlb, we can see in Figures 10(c) and
11(c) that the mediator can ensure good qlb even if
providers do not have any consideration to their uti-
lization. Obviously, the smaller the kn value, the bet-
ter the ensured qlb in the system. In these results, it
is worth noting that, even when ensuring participants’
satisfaction is the most important in an application
(when kn = k
′), the way in which SQLB computes the
providers’ score allows it to ensure an acceptable qlb in
the system as far as providers take care of their load,
e.g. in the normal case (see Figure 10(c)). This is not
the case for the preference-based case, when kn = k
′,
even if providers’ preferences are the same (see Fig-
ure 11(c)). But, by setting small kn values, SQLB can
ensure short response times for consumers in both cases,
no matter how providers compute their intentions.
The ensured response times with different kn values
are shown by Figures 12(a) and 12(b). We can observe
that, as expected, the mediator can ensure good re-
sponse times, even if providers are not interested in, by
playing with parameter kn (the kn = 2 and kn = 10 re-
sults). This is not the case when the mediator does not
regulate the system and providers do not care about
the system performance (the kn = k
′ results for the
preference-based case).
The results in this section demonstrate that with
small kn values, one can adapt SQLB to applications
where the mediator needs to regulate the system w.r.t.
a given predefined function (qlb in this work) without
mattering how participants compute their intentions.
With high kn values, one can adapt SQLB to applica-
tions where the mediator has to meet the participants’
expectations.
7 Related Work
The query allocation problem, which appears as a
subproblem of query processing [16], is very gen-
eral and is addressed in many domains such as dis-
tributed databases, networking systems, grid systems,
and multi-agent systems. The assumptions and tech-
niques to allocate queries often differ depending on the
context and the system goals. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the problem of allocating queries by considering
qlb and the participants’ intentions has not received
much attention and is still an open field. In the re-
mainder of this section, we discuss five main approaches
related to our query allocation framework: economics,
data mediators, multi-agent systems, load balancing ap-
proaches, and web services. Notice that the scope of this
paper goes well beyond related work by characterizing
the participants’ expectations in the long-run, propos-
ing measures to analyze them and new algorithms to
exploit them.
7.1 Economics
Economics is a social science concerned mainly with
description and analysis of the production, distribu-
tion, and consumption of goods and services. It is sub-
divided into microeconomics, which studies how indi-
viduals make decisions to allocate limited resources,
and macroeconomics, which studies aggregated indica-
tors to understand how the whole economy functions.
We are interested in the former in this work. In the
following, we first discuss some microeconomic prop-
erties that are closely related to the satisfaction no-
tion we proposed in this paper. Then, we present some
microeconomics-based approaches to allocate queries.
7.1.1 Theory
In microeconomics, one describes participants’ prefer-
ences by means of a utility function. A utility function
assigns a numerical value to each element of a set of
choices, ranking such elements according to the partic-
ipants’ preferences [21]. That is, for each query (good
or service) a participant computes its marginal utility
of participating in the allocation of such a query. No-
tice that, in our case, the participants’ intentions rep-
resent somehow their marginal utility. Then, a partici-
pant computes its total utility gained in a given set of
queries by adding its marginal utility gained in each
query. In other words, as the satisfaction notion, the
total utility is an abstract concept that measures the
happiness or gratification of participants by consuming
or performing queries. Furthermore, the total utility as
well as the satisfaction makes no assumption about the
way in which participants compute their marginal util-
ity function and intention function, respectively. This
is because both marginal utility and intention func-
tions depend on applications and participants. We go
beyond this by proposing a way in which participants
can compute their intentions. For all this, total utility
is clearly related to the notion of satisfaction we pre-
sented in this paper, but the satisfaction notion differs
from the total utility in three ways. First, the satisfac-
tion is bounded by 0 and 1 and normalized while the
total utility is neither bounded nor normalized. There-
fore, one can easily compare the satisfaction of partici-
pants. Second, while total utility generally considers all
the queries that a participant consumed or performed,
satisfaction only considers the k last queries. This is
very useful when participants have a limited capacity.
Finally, total utility is generally reduced to monetary
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concerns only, which is not the case for the satisfaction
notion.
Moreover, most economic properties (e.g. pareto-
optimality, nash equilibrium, and individual rational-
ity) focus on only one interaction. As a result, most of
the economic approaches [9], which are based on one
of these economic properties, look for the happiness of
participants in solely one query allocation and not in
the long-run. In contrast, the satisfaction notion we pro-
posed represents the happiness of participants in several
interactions, i.e. in the long-run. Also, in the field of dis-
tributed rational decision making [38], participants are
assumed to be individually rational: the utility of any
participant in the process is no less than the utility it
would have by not participating. This is not relevant
in environments where participants may have the in-
terest that the system be efficient and hence, in some
query allocations, they may be interested in participat-
ing in some query allocations even if this means to lose
sometimes. Furthermore, it is not relevant in coopera-
tive contexts where some participants may be imposed,
which implies having a lower utility in participating.
Therefore, the satisfaction notion is still relevant be-
cause it is a long-run notion.
7.1.2 Approaches
Economic approaches can claim to take into account the
participants’ intentions and have been shown to provide
efficient query allocation in heterogeneous systems [10,
42]. A survey of economic models for various aspects of
distributed system is presented in [9].
Mariposa [42] is one of the first systems to deal with
the query allocation problem in distributed information
systems using a bidding process. In Mariposa, all the
incoming queries are processed by a broker site that
requests providers for bids. Providers bid for acquir-
ing queries based on a local bulletin board. Then, the
broker site selects a set of bids that has an aggregate
price and delay under a bid curve provided by the con-
sumer. Mariposa ensures a crude form of load balanc-
ing by modifying the providers’ bid with the providers’
load. Nevertheless, our experimentations show that, in
some cases, providers suffer from overutilization. Be-
sides, queries may not be treated even if providers exist
in the system. This leads to a certain domination of the
providers’ intentions over the consumers’ intentions.
In [28], the authors focus on the optimization al-
gorithms for buying and selling query answers, and
the negotiation strategy. Their query trading algorithm
runs iteratively, progressively selecting the best execu-
tion plan. At each iteration, the buyer sends requests
for bids, for a set of queries, and sellers reply with of-
fers (bids) for dealing with them. Then, the buyer finds
the best possible execution plan based on the offers
it received. These actions are iterated until either the
found execution plan is not better than the plan found
in the previous iteration or the set of queries has not
been modified (i.e. there is no new subqueries). This ap-
proach uses some kind of bargaining between the buyer
and the sellers, but with different queries at each it-
eration. However, this way of dealing with subqueries
optimization is orthogonal to our proposal and one may
combine them to improve performance.
In [18], the authors propose an economic flexible me-
diation approach that allocates queries by taking into
account the providers’ quality (given by consumers) and
the providers’ bids. In contrast to our approach, the au-
thors inherently assume that participants are captive.
In addition, their proposed economic model is comple-
mentary to our proposal and one can combine them to
obtain an economic version of SQLB, by computing
bids with respect to intentions [33,34].
7.2 Data Mediators
Over the last years, data mediator systems [44] have
been accepted as a viable approach for integrating het-
erogeneous and distributed providers. Data mediators
allow consumers to query different providers that are
typically wrapped to provide an uniform interface to
a mediator. Two of the most prominent approaches
are TSIMMIS [13] and Information Manifold [19]. In
data mediator systems, the mediator allocates queries
to providers and integrates results for consumers, much
like distributed database systems [27]. Nevertheless,
data mediators require some global information such
as global schemas [43], which is difficult to maintain in
dynamic systems because source schemas change fre-
quently. SQLB does not require any global knowledge,
but it does not address the integration problem.
7.3 Multi-agent Systems
In multi-agent systems, the Contract Net Protocol
(CNP) [41] is often mentioned as a way to allocate
queries. However, CNP is a simple protocol and there
is no control to regulate the system. Besides, it is gener-
ally assumed a rather small number of participants and
a detailed description of the conditions of execution,
which is not our case. Several approaches of middle-
agents have been defined [8,17,26] and a survey can be
found in [15]. A classical goal of middle-agents is to find
the providers that are able to deal with a given query
by matching providers’ capabilities advertisements with
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the given query. All these works are efficient but the
number of selected providers may remain too large.
Thus, some works have investigated the possibil-
ity of reducing the list of selected providers. For ex-
ample, Z. Zhang and C. Zhang [45] propose to per-
form classical matchmaking and then refine the result
list of providers by considering the providers’ quality.
Nonetheless, the participants’ intentions are not consid-
ered by the providers selection procedure, which does
not allow a participant to have an active participation
in the selection process.
D. Bernstein et al. [7] propose an adaptive approach
to allocate queries, in file sharing-systems, based on the
machine learning methodology. In this approach, a con-
sumer can perform partial downloads from providers
before finally settling on one. This approach allows the
consumers to improve response times by aborting bad
download attempts until an acceptable provider is dis-
covered. However, the authors inherently assume that
consumers are only interested in response times and
providers have no interests to perform queries.
7.4 Load Balancing Approach
In the context of large-scale and heterogeneous dis-
tributed systems, most of the work on query alloca-
tion has mainly dealt with the problem of balanc-
ing queries among providers. There exist two well-
known approaches to balance queries across providers:
Load Based and Capacity basedmethods. Load Based
methods [12,6] are not suitable for heterogeneous sys-
tems since they inherently assume that providers and
queries are homogeneous. Capacity based methods [24,
35,40] allocate queries in accordance to the providers’
utilization, i.e. they allocate each incoming query to
providers with the most available capacity. Neverthe-
less, all these approaches have no consideration for the
participants’ intentions.
In [30] and [31], we propose a method and strat-
egy, respectively, to balance queries among providers by
considering providers’ intentions and satisfaction, but
no notion of intentions nor satisfaction of consumers is
considered.
7.5 Web Services
To locate and select services, web services (the
providers) have to describe properly all their proposed
services [5]. Once services have been properly described,
these descriptions are made available, via a service di-
rectory (the registry), to those interested in using them
(the consumers). These directories can be hosted and
managed by a trusted entity (centralized approach)
or each provider can host and manage them (peer-
to-peer approach). When a consumer has located the
providers providing the service it desires, it then selects
the provider that it wants. Then, the consumer selects
the provider with respect to its interests, e.g. with the
highest score among the providers in the registry. How-
ever, providers cannot express their intentions to per-
form queries and are considered as captive values.
8 Conclusion
We considered distributed information systems where
participants are autonomous to leave the system at will.
In this context, it is crucial to consider the participants’
intentions to allocate and perform queries so that their
expectations, response times, and system capacity are
ensured. We presented, in this paper, a general and
complete solution to allocate queries among providers
by considering the participants’ intentions and query
load balancing (qlb). Our work carried out fourth main
contributions.
First, we characterized the participants’ expecta-
tions in a new model, which allows to evaluate a system
from a satisfaction point of view. The definitions that
we proposed are original, considering the long-run no-
tions of adequation and satisfaction. They are indepen-
dent of the way participants compute their intentions
and how the mediator considers them. This model facil-
itates the design and evaluation of new query allocation
methods for these environments. The proposed model
is general, and thus, can be used for any distributed
systems architecture.
Second, we proposed three different measures to
evaluate the quality of qlb methods:
– The mean measure reflects the effort that a query
allocation method does for equally either maximiz-
ing or minimizing a given set of values.
– The fairness measure evaluates how fair a query
allocation method is.
– The balance measure measures the Min-Max values.
We proved that using these proposed measures to-
gether, one can predict possible consumers’ and
providers’ departures from the system.
Third, we presented the SQLB framework for bal-
ancing queries in these environments. The originality of
SQLB is to perform all query demand while satisfying
participants’ expectations. SQLB strongly differs from
the related work in several ways:
– It allows providers to trade their preferences for
their utilization while keeping their strategic infor-
mation private.
26
– It affords consumers the flexibility to trade their
preferences for providers’ reputation.
– It allows trading consumers’ intentions for
providers’ intentions.
– It strives to balance queries at runtime via the par-
ticipants’ satisfaction, thus reducing starvation.
– It affords the mediator to regulate the system with
respect to some predefined function and can adapt
the query allocation process to the kind of applica-
tion.
– It can ensure good levels of satisfaction as far as the
system is adequate to participants and vice versa,
which allows participants to reach their expecta-
tions in the system whether they correctly work out
their intentions.
Fourth, we evaluated and compared SQLB with
two baseline query allocation methods (Capacity ba-
sed and Mariposa-like), in two kinds of environments:
captive and autonomous. We showed through experi-
mentation that, by considering together the qlb and
satisfaction of participants, SQLB significantly outper-
forms both baseline methods. We observed that partic-
ipants are, in general, very satisfied with SQLB and
Mariposa-like , which is not the case for Capacity ba-
sed that suffers from several providers’ departures due
to dissatisfaction. However, Mariposa-like has serious
problems for balancing queries correctly. On the one
hand, we showed that, unlike the baseline methods,
SQLB maintains the high-interest, high-adaptation,
and high-capacity providers in the system. On the other
hand, the results show that while baseline methods lose
more than 20% of consumers (for all workloads), SQLB
has no consumer’s departures! We showed the self-
adaptability of SQLB to the expectations and satis-
faction of participants. We also discussed its adaptabil-
ity to different kinds of applications. All these results
demonstrate that SQLB can scale up with autonomous
participants, while Capacity based and Mariposa-like
cannot.
As future work, we plan to address fault-tolerant is-
sues so that SQLB ensures good system performance
even in the presence of participants’ failures. We also
plan to study the impact, on performance and partici-
pants’ satisfaction, of introducing the random providers
selection phase (discussed in Section 5.3.2). In our ex-
perimentations, we also noted that self-organizing phe-
nomenons occur. When the system is composed of sev-
eral mediators and the participants have divergent in-
terests, the participants that share the same interests
gather on the same mediator. We wish to explore this
phenomenon that we not observe with the other ap-
proaches. Finally, the problem addressed in this paper
as that addressed by economic approaches is to regulate
a distributed information system while satisfying par-
ticipants. We then plan to develop an economic version
of SQLB, based on [18], to scale up to several medi-
ators and to analyze in detail the contributions of the
use of money for allocating queries.
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